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CHAPTER 5 
LANGUAGE, LAW AND LOGIC: 
PLP.IN LEGAL DRAFTING FOR THE ELECTRONIC AGE 
Layman E. Allen 
University of Michigan 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The achievement of current demands for clearer legal drafting 
in the United States (New York, 1973 and President's Executive Or-
der, 1978) and Great Britain (Renton Report, 1975) can be aided by 
applying modern logic to improve the language of the law. In con-
sidering how the expression of legal norms can be clarified by us-
ing some formal language techniques, particular attention will be 
given to alternatives for dealing with problems of inadvertent im-
precision in current legal drafting, alternatives that facilitate 
human understanding as well as enhance the possibilities for analy-
sis by computer. A brief sketch of the imprecision of the expres-
sion of legal norms will help place in context the discussion of 
this 1-trio: language, law, and logic. This imprecision can be 
categorized into two types of uncertainty: the uncertainty that 
results from what is omitted in the writing and the uncertainty 
that results from what is written. Both of these types of uncer-
tainty may be deliberate by the drafter of the document, or they 
may occur inadvertently. Here, attention is being focused on the 
inadvertent written uncertainties. This and further detail is sum-
marized in Figure 1 on the next page. 
There are two kinds of written uncertainty that may be deliber-
ate, and the same two kinds may also be inadvertent. These are the 
uncertainty stemming from ambiguity and the uncertainty stemming 
from vagueness and generality. In legal writing, the uncertainty 
from vagueness and generality tends to be more deliberate than in-
advertent, but the uncertainty from ambiguity tends to be more in-
advertent than deliberate. It is the inadvertent ambiguity prob-
lems that are of concern here, because they are the ones to which 
modern logic techniques can be usefully applied. The ambiguity 
problems are of two types: semantic and syntactic. And the syn-
tactic ambiguities occur both within sentences and between sen-
tences. These syntactic uncertainties within and between sentences 
are regarded as being the structural problems of legal drafting. 
For the most part, the discussion that follows is on the structural 
aspects between sentences. The logic that deals with relationships 
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between sentences is far simpler than the logic that deals with re-
lationships within sentences. Much more will need to be said about 
the latter. It is enough to get started on constructive alterna-

























Taxonomy of Imprecision in Legal Drafting 
In focusing on the between-sentence structure of legal draft-
ing, a brief example from the American patent statute is considered 
first. Then some aspects of the definitions of structural terms 
are discussed and some "lowest common denominators" of between-sen-
tence structure are defined. Third, there is a detailed examina-
tion on the awesome ambiguity of the term 'unless' with its poten-
tialities for being interpreted in more than 4,000 different 
logical ways. This is followed by a discussion of the normalized 
expression of legal norms and some simple diagrammatic techniques 
for expressing their structure. Fifth, some criteria are consid-
ered for characterizing the semantics, the structure, the expres-
sion, and the drafting adequacy in legal documents. Finally, some 
brief conclusory remarks appear at the end. 
2 AN EXAMPLE OF UNNECESSARY STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY AND AMBIGUITY 
A brief example of some of the kinds of unnecessary structural 
ambiguity and unnecessary structural complexity that attention is 
being called to in this paper appears in the American patent 
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statute. It reads, in part, as follows: 
Section 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss 
of right to patent 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this 
country, or patented or described in a printed publication 
in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof 
by the applicant for patent, or 
(b) the invention was patented or described in a 
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public 
use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to 
the date of the application for patent in the United States,or 
(c) ••• , or 
(g) 
The first question about section 102 deals with its between-
sentence structure and revolves around interpretation of the word 
'unless'. This structure is emphasized when section 102 is rewrit-





(a) S2, or 
(b) S3, or 
(c) ... , or 
(g) 
A person shall be entitled to a patent 
the invention was known .•. patent 
the invention was patented •.• States 
Is Section 102 more appropriately interpreted as asserting merely: 
If not S2 and not S3 and ••• , then Sl? 
Or is it more appropriately interpreted as asserting both: 
If not S2 and not S3 and •.• , then Sl, and 
If S2 or S3 (or any of the other conditions of (c) 
through (g)), then not Sl? 
In other words, is the occurrence of 'unless' in this section bet-
ter interpreted as a weak 'unless' that asserts merely a condi-
tional statement or as a strong 'unless' that asserts a bicondi-
tional statement? 
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The second question is also about between-sentence structure 
and 'unless'. Is the strong 'unless' interpretation one for which 
the meaning of 'not Sl' in it is: 
It is not so that a person shall be entitled to a patent? 
Or is it one for which the meaning of 'not Sl' is: 
A person shall not be entitled to a patent? 
In the first, it is merely permitted that the person not be enti-
tled, but in the second it is obligatory that the person not be 
entitled. 
The third question looks like it might be a within-sentence 
structural matter, but when analysed from the viewpoint of the 
logic involving quantifiers (sometimes called predicate logic, or 
first-order functional logic) it is seen to involve structure that 
is both within and between sentences. This question also involves 
'unless' through the Sl that occurs as the first constituent of 
the 'Sl unless S2 ..• ' statement. The question is whether the 'A 
person shall' of Sl is intended in the sense 
Some person(s) shall ••• 
or in the sense 
Every person shall •... 
Other sections of the statute make it clear that the first is what 
is intended, but also that a qualified version of the second is 
also intended. Section 101 provides: 
Section 101. Inventions patentable 
Whosoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 
And Section 103 provides: 
Section 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious 
subject rna t ter 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in Section 102 
of this title, if the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the sub-
ject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not 
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made. 
From the context in which Section 102 appears, it is clear that it 
is only those persons who meet the requirements of Section 101 
and 103 who "shall be entitled" under Section 102. So, when the 
requirements of Section 102 are met, it is intended that "some per-
sons shall be entitled ••• ," and who those are can be clarified as 
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"every person (who meets the requirements of the other sections) 
shall be entitled •••• " 
The fourth question is clearly a matter of within-sentence 
structure. It involves the phrase 'in this country' in subsection 
(b). Does this phrase qualify only the 'on sale' that immediately 
precedes it, or does it qualify both 'on sale' and the phrase 'in 
public use' as well? If it qualifies only 'on sale', then one of 
the sufficient conditions for non-entitlement under Section 102 is: 
the invention was ••• in public use (anywhere at all) more 
than one year prior to the date of the application for 
patent in the United States 
But if 'in this country' qualifies both, then there is more to 
this particular sufficient condition for non-entitlement, namely: 
the invention was ••• in public use in this country more 
than one year prior to the date of the application for 
patent in the United States. 
It is a somewhat trickier and more complex matter to control 
the clarity of within-sentence structure than the between-sentence 
structure, as is perhaps evidenced by the very title of this sub-
section. Does it signal: 
1) Ambiguity (in general) andunnecessary structural complexity, 
or 
2) Unnecessary ambiguity and unnecessary structural complexity, 
or 
3) Unnecessary structural ambiguity and unnecessary structural 
complexity? 
The ambiguities of the within-sentence structure of a statement 
can often be detected by attempting to convert the statement into 
an equivalent alternative in which relationships expressed by 
within-sentence structure are replaced by relationships expressed 
by between-sentence structure. Various alternative interpretations 
of the original statement turn out to have different between-sen-
tence structure. For example, strong 'unless's have different 
(they have more) structure than weak 'unless's. There are other 
types of within-sentence ambiguities in a statement that can be de-
tected by converting the statement into an equivalent alternative 
that continues to express relationships by within-sentence struc-
ture in which the ambiguous parts are replaced by disambiguating· 
replacements. For example, the ambiguous 'W's may not Y' has two 
(disambiguated) interpretations: 
W's are obligated to not Y. 
W's are permitted to not Y. 
Another example is 'NoW shall Y', which has at least the following 
two interpretations: 
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Every W is obligated to not Y. 
There is no W that is obligated toY. 
(That is, every W is permitted to not Y). 
These examples illustrate one of the pervasive subtleties of with-
in-sentence structure: how the placement of the negation operator 
in the sequence of words in a statement affects the meaning of the 
statement. It is a subtlety that haunts legal discourse embarrass-
ingly. 
3 DEFINITIONS OF STRUCTURAL TERMS 
To achieve clearer structure the use of definitions in legal 
drafting needs improvement. One of the leading contemporary 
authorities on legal drafting explains that in part legal defi-
nitions " ••• are currently in dispute ••• because many are inac-
curate descriptions of how the draftsman has actually used his 
terms ••• "and counsels users that the " ••• first thing to remember 
about legal definitions is that they should be used only where 
necessary." 
One area where significant improvements can be achieved by us-
ing definitions in legal drafting is in the terms used to indicate 
structural relationships. Furthermore, some typographical devices 
can also be used to help remind drafters about whether given oc-
currences of defined terms are intended in their defined senses. 
At the very least, a drafter should have available tools that per-
mit a clear indication of when a defined term is intended in its 
defined sense and when it is intended in its ordinary language 
sense. One such device that would work almost all of the time is 
to capitalize the initial letter(s) of a Defined Term when used in 
its defined sense and just print the defined term in its usual un-
capitalized way when used in its ordinary language sense. Capital-
izing initial letters as a signal of a defined use would only run 
into difficulty when the term appeared as the first word of a sen-
tence or for some other reason was to be capitalized. Then, a 
reader would not know whether the term was capitalized because 
used in the defined sense or capitalized for the other reason. An 
alternative that would be completely unambiguous all of the time 
is to capitalize all of the letters in the DEFINED TERM to indi-
cate its usage in the defined sense. There are many other com-
pletely unambiguous alternatives (dEfined tErm, Defined terM, *de-
fined term*, :defined term:, ddefined termd, d.efined t.erm, 
d*efined t*erm, etc.), but full capitalization seems as good as 
any of the others on all other grounds and preferable to them in 
being the least unconventional and less in need of explanation. 
Having available a clear way of indicating use of a term in its 
defined sense would be a distinct improvement over present practice, 
but it would still leave some problems. The occurrence of a de-
fined term in its uncapitalized form might mean that the drafter 
80 
LANGUAGE, LAW AND LOGIC 
thought about it and intended the term in its ordinary language 
sense. On the other hand, it might also represent only the fact 
that the drafter did not think about the problem at all, but just 
wrote the term in its ordinary form. It would be helpful to be able 
to make this distinction clearly, also. This, too, is an easily-
solved problem by a simple subscripting convention. Add a subscript 
'o' to the end of the DEFINED TERM0 to indicate use in the (o)rdi-
nary language sense and let the ordinary uncapitalized use signal 
an occurrence where the drafter has not thought about the problem. 
These three alternatives would probably enable a drafter to 
deal with most cases likely to be encountered. But occasionally, 
there may be situations in which the drafter has thought about the 
problem, but for some good reason (political or other) does not 
wish to make a clear choice between the defined sense and the ordi-
nary language sense. The drafter's intent after careful thought is 
to be ambiguous about which is appropriate and to postpone that 
choice for some interpreter to make later. Furthermore, that may be 
exactly what the drafter wishes to communicate to the intended 
audience -- that the passage has been drafted in an ambiguous form 
deliberately. On the other hand, although the ambiguity may be in-
tentional, the drafter may wish to refrain from telling the audi-
ence so. This, the drafter could always achieve by the mere expe-
dient of leaving the occurrence of the term uncapitalized. The 
deliberate (a)mbiguity, intended to be communicated, can be signal-
led by adding a subscript 'a' to the end of the DEFINED TERMa. 
In summary, five different kinds of occurrences of defined 
terms in legal drafting are described in Table 1, and four ways of 






Kinds of Occurrences 
1. Intended in the defined sense. 
2. Intended in the ordinary language sense. 
3. Intended to be ambiguous about whether occur-
renee is in defined sense or ordinary language 
sense. 
4. (a) Drafter thought about problem, intended to 
be ambiguous about whether this occurrence 
is in defined sense or ordinary language 
sense, but does not wish to tell audience 
about the deliberate choice to be ambiguous, 
OR 
(b) Drafter did not think about the problem of 
whether this occurrence is in the defined 
sense or ordinary language sense. 
Table 1 
Kinds of Occurrences of Defined Terms and Their Representations 
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Using these conventions to indicate defined terms, it is easy 
to clearly define a set of terms for use in indicating unambiguous-
ly the structural relationships between sentences in legal docu-
ments by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
truth of statements using these terms. These defined terms can, in 
turn, be used as "lowest common denominators" in terms of which 
other structural terms can be defined. The terms to be defined are 
the customary ones of propositional logic: 
AND, OR, NOT, IF ••• THEN---, and IF AND ONLY IF ••• THEN---. 
1. The statement 'Sentence 1 AND Sentence 2' expresses a con-
junction. It is true when both Sentence 1 and Sentence 2 
are true, but not otherwise. 
2. The statement 'Sentence 1 OR Sentence 2' expresses an inclu-
sive disjunction. It is true when at least one of the two 
sentences (Sentence 1 or Sentence 2) is true, but not other-
wise. 
3. The statement 'NOT Sentence 1' expresses a negation. It is 
true when Sentence 1 is false, but not otherwise. (If an 
actual sentence were substituted for 'Sentence 1', the 'NOT' 
would be imbedded in it or be replaced by the phrase 'IT IS 
NOT SO THAT'. Hence, if 'Sentence 1' is 'The pot is hot', 
then 'Not Sentence 1' would be either 'The pot is NOT hot' 
or 'IT IS NOT SO THAT the pot is hot'.) 
4. The statement 'IF Sentence 1, THEN Sentence 2' expresses a 
conditional. It is true'when both Sentence 1 and Sentence 
2 are true; it is false when Sentence 1 is true and Sen-
tence 2 is false; and it is sometimes true and sometimes 
false when Sentence 1 is false. 
(Warning: The definition of IF ••• THEN--- given here is 
not the material implication of classical two-valued logic. 
It is in its present form incomplete; it needs to be devel-
oped formally to closely parallel the concept of IF ••• 
THEN --- that Anderson and Belnap (1974) have specified and 
that they call 'relevant implication'. 
5. The statement 'IF AND ONLY IF Sentence 1, THEN Sentence 2' 
expresses a biconditional. It is true when both Sentence 1 
and Sentence 2 are true; it is false when either Sentence 1 
or Sentence 2 (but not both) is false; and it is sometimes 
true and sometimes false when both Sentence 1 and Sentence 2 
are false. (The same warning that goes with the IF THEN 
---definition above applies to this IF AND ONLY IF ••• THEN 
--- as well. ) 
Alternatively, it would have been possible to formally define 
#5 contextually in terms of #4 and #1 as follows: 
IF AND ONLY 
IF Sentence 1, =df 
THEN SENTENCE 2. 
IF Sentence 1, THEN Sentence 2, 
AND 
IF Sentence 2, THEN Sentence 1. 
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Similarly, it is possible to formally define other structural 
terms that relate sentences to each other and specify unambiguously 
the many alternative senses of their ordinary language usages. For 
example, two senses of 'if' can be clearly distinguished: 
Sentence 1, 
IF1 
=df IF Sentence 2, THEN Sentence 1. 
Sentence 2. 
Sentence 1, IF Sentence 2, THEN Sentence 1, 
IF2 
=df AND 
Sentence 2. IF Sentence 1, THEN Sentence 2. 
two senses of 'only if': 
Sentence 1, 
ONLY IF1 =df IF NOT Sentence 2, THEN NOT Sentenee 1. 
Sentence 2. 
Sentence 1, IF NOT Sentence 2, THEN NOT Sentence 1, 
ONLY IF2 
=df AND 
Sentence 2. IF NOT Sentence 1, THEN NOT Sentence 2. 
and samples of the more than 4,000 senses of 'unless': 
Sentence 1, 
UNLESS1 =df IF NOT Sentence 2, THEN Sentence 1. 
Sentence 2. 
Sentence 1, IF NOT Sentence 2, THEN Sentence 1, 
UNLESS2 
=df AND 
Sentence 2. IF Sentence 2, THEN NOT Sentence 1 




Sentence 2. IF Sentence 2, THEN X shall NOT Y. 
X shall Y, IF NOT Sentence 2, THEN X shall Y, 
=df AND UNLESS
4 Sentence 2. IF Sentence 2, THEN IT IS NOT SO THAT X 
shall Y. 
With these structural terms defined, the drafter is armed with 
precise tools for relating the sentence constituents of her mes-
sages and thereby achieving a form of "plain language" that is not 
only more understandable by human audiences, but also is compati-
ble with having computers do more analysis than they would other-
wise be able to do. 
4 THE AWESOME AMBIGUITY OF 'UNLESS' 
The need for legal drafters to have available tools for more 
careful expression of between-sentence structure can perhaps be 
made glaringly apparent by considering one of the most ambiguous 
terms now in general use -- the seemingly innocent little 'unless'. 
What is truly alarming, however., is that 'unless' may be only 
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symptomatic of a hundred or more similar seemingly innocent little 
between-sentence connectors that are similarly astonishingly ambig-
uous. Consider a statement of the form: 
~· unless ~· (where ~ and b are subsidiary sentences) (1) 
There are two interpretations of (1): 
S. IF NOT ~. THEN ~· (a single IF-THEN interpretation) 
D. IF NOT b, THEN a, AND IF~. THEN NOT a. (a double IF-THEN 
interpretation)-
Additional interpretations of statements like (1) are apparent 
when the structure of a is examined. Look first at some of its 
possible within-senten~e structure and then at some possible be-
tween-sentence structure. Consider a statement of the form: 
W's shall Y, unless~· ~: W's shall Y.) (2) 
There are at least 18 different interpretations possible of (2), 
where x is the first IF-THEN part and y is the second IF-THEN part 
of an interpretation, x/y: 
AOC/AOCN AOC/AOM AOC/SOCN AOC/APCN AOC/SOM AOC/APM AOC/SPCN 
AOC/SPM AOC/---
















IF NOT b, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y, AND 
IF b, THEN all W's are obligated to do NOT Y. 
(NOT a: all W's are obligated to do NOT Y.) 
IF NOT b, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y, AND 
IF b, THEN all W's are obligated NOT to do Y. 
(NOT a: all W's are obligated NOT to do Y.) 
IF NOT b, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y, AND 
IF b, THEN some W's (in the sense that there is at least 
one-W) are obligated to do NOT Y. 
(NOT a: some W's are obligated to do NOT Y, i.e., IT IS 
NOT SO THAT all W's are NOT obligated to do NOT Y.) 
IF NOT b, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y, AND 
IF b, THEN all W's are permitted to do NOT Y. 
(NOT a: all W's are permitted to do NOT Y, i.e., all 
W's are NOT obligated NOT to do NOT Y.) 
IF NOT b, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y, AND 
IF b, THEN some W's are obligated NOT to do Y. 
(NOT a: some W's are obligated NOT to do Y.) 
IF NOT b, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y, AND 
IF~. THEN all W's are permitted NOT to do Y. 
(NOT a: all W's are permitted NOT to do Y, i.e., all 
W's are NOT obligated to do Y.) 
IF NOT b, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y, AND 
IF~. THEN some W's are permitted to do NOT Y. 
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(NOT~= some W's are permitted to do NOT Y.) 
IF NOT£, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y, AND 
IF£, THEN some W's are permitted NOT to do Y. 
(NOT~= some W's are permitted NOT to do Y, i.e., 
IT IS NOT SO THAT all W's are obligated to do Y.) 
IF NOT£, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y. 
Each of the second nine interpretations is exactly like one of the 
first nine interpret~tions but with the following SOC part replac-
ing the AOC part as the first IF-THEN part of the interpretation: 
SOC IF NOT£, THEN some W's are obligated to do Y. 
The capital letters used in the names of the interpretations 
indicate properties of the results of the IF-THEN parts of the 
interpretations: 
A Indicates that the result of the IF-THEN part is an 
(A)LL statement. 
S Indicates that the result of the IF-THEN part is a 
(S)OME statement. 
0 Indicates that the result of the IF-THEN part is an 
(O)BLIGATION statement. 
P Indicates that the result of the IF-THEN part is a 
(P)ERMISSION statement. 
C Indicates that the result of the IF-THEN part is a 
(C)OMMISSION statement. 
M Indicates that the result of the IF-THEN part is an 
O(M)ISSION statement. 
N Indicates (N)egations (NOT or IT IS NOT SO THAT). 
Hence, AOCN indicates that the result of the IF-THEN part is an 
(A)ll-(O)bligation-(C)ommission statement. (For example: All 
X-persons are obligated to do NOT Y.) 
The logical relationships among these 18 different interpre-
tations of (2) are summarized in Figure 2. The logical relation-
ship indicated by 'v o--~w' is that w can be logically inferred 
from v, but not vice versa. In other words, v is (logically) 
"stronger" than w, and w is "weaker" than v. With this notation 
for indicating logical relationships, every logical relationship in 
Figure 2 can be summarized as: 
••• A ••• o---> ... S 
••• o ••• o---)o ••• P 
••• CN ••• o---> ••• M 
where (1) indicates the rest of the statement, 
and 
(2) the rest of the left statement is never weaker 
than the rest of the right statement. 
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AOC/ AOC/ AOC/ 
AOM SOCN APCN 
L;x:Xl 
AOC/ AOC/ AOC/ 








SOC/ SOC/ SOC/ 
AOM SOCN APCN 
rxx~ 
SOC/ SOC/ SOC/ 
SOM APM SPCN 
~l/ 
SOC/ 
L [ o---)o] R •••••••.•• SPM 
~ 
SOC/ 
where 'L [ o---> ] R' indicates that each statement on the 
(R)ight side of Figure 2 is deducible from the corresponding 
statement on the (L)eft side, but not vice-ve1·sa. Hence, 
AOC/AOCN o---> SOC/AOCN, AOC/SPM o---~ SOC/SPM, etc. 
Figure 2 
Logical Relationships Among 18 Different Interpretations 
of the Statement: W's Shall Y, Unless l· 
The strongest interpretation of (2) is AOC/AOCN, and the weakest 
is SOC/---. All 17 other interpretations can be deduced from 
the strongest. However, none of the other interpretations is 
deducible from the weakest, but it is deducible from every one 
of them. This is apparent from Figure 2. 
When the a of (1) is a permission-type statement, rather than 
an obligation~type, there is a parallel set of 18 different 
interpretations. Consider a statement of the form: 
W's may Y, unless l· (!!_ = W's may Y.) 
Interpretations: APC/AOCN APC/AOM APC/SOCN APC/APCN APC/SOM 
APC/APM APC/SPCN APC/SPM APC/---
SPC/AOCN SPC/AOM SPC/SOCN SPC/APCN SPC/SOM 
SPC/APM SPC/SPCN SPC/SPM SPC/---
(3) 
APC/AOCN IF NOT b, THEN all W's are permitted to do Y, AND 
IF l, THEN all W's are obligated to do NOT Y. 
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APC/AOM IF NOT b, THEN all W's are permitted to do Y, AND 
IF£, THEN all W's are obligated NOT to do Y. 
SPC/--- IF NOT b, THEN some W's are permitted to do Y. 
The 18 interpretations of (3) are the same as the 18 interpretations 
of (2) except that everywhere that AOC or SOC appear in the 
first IF-THEN part of an interpretation of (2) they are replaced 
by APC and SPC, respectively, in the corresponding interpret-
ation of (3). 
The logical relationships among the 18 interpretations of (3) 
are the same as those among the 18 of (2). The strongest and 
weakest of the 18 are the APC/AOCN and SPC/--- shown above. The 
other 16 interpretations of (3) are, in terms of their logical 
force, in between these two. 
When the ~ of (1) has the form of a negation of an obligation-
type statement, the ambiguity reaches its peak. There are 36 
different logical interpretations of 'unless' possible. Consider a 
statement of the form: 
NoW shall Y, unless b. (a NoW shall Y.) 
Interpretations: 
al a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 bl b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 b8 b9 
cl c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 dl d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 
(4) 
There are four interpretations of the result of the first IF-THEN 
part (i.e., 'NoW shall Y.'): 
a AOCN/ IF NOT b, THEN all W's are obligated to do NOT Y. 
b APCN/ all-W's are permitted to do NOT Y. 
c AOM/ ••• all W's are obligated NOT to do Y. 
d APM/ ••• all W's are permitted NOT to do Y. 
There are nine interpretations of the result of the second IF-THEN 
part (i.e., 'NOT (noW shall Y).'): 
1 /AOC IF b, THEN all W's are obligated to do Y (i.e., 
-all W's are obligated to do NOT NOT Y). 
2 /AOMN all W's are obligated NOT to do NOT Y. 
3 /APC all W's are permitted to do Y. 
4 /(AN)PCN for all persons, IT IS NOT SO THAT IF a per-
son is a W, THEN that person is permitted to do NOT 
Y. 
5 /SOMN some W's are obligated NOT to do NOT Y (i.e., 
IT IS NOT SO THAT all W's are permitted to do NOT 
Y). 
6 /APMN all W' s are permitted NOT to do NOT Y. 
7 /(AN)OCN for all persons, IT IS NOT SO THAT IF a per-
son is a W, THEN that person is obligated to do 
NOT Y. 
8 /SPMN ••• some persons are permitted NOT to do NOT Y, 
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9 1---
(i.e., IT IS NOT SO THAT all W1 s are obligated 
to do NOT Y). 
(There is no second IF-THEN part to the interpre-
tation.) 
Each of the four first IF-THEN parts combines with each of the nine 
second IF-THEN parts to form the 36 different interpretations of 





IF NOT E_, 
AND IF E., 
IF NOT b, 
AND IF li, 
Y. 
THEN all W's 
THEN all W's 
THEN all W's 





to do NOT Y, 
to do Y. 
to do NOT Y, 
NOT to do NOT 
d9 APM/ IF NOT E., THEN all W's are permitted NOT to do Y. 
The logical relationships among the 36 interpretations of (4) 
are summarized in Figure 3. A given interpretation, x/y, is deduc-
ible from a second interpretation, v/w, IF AND ONLY IF (A) x is 
deducible from v, and (B) y is deducible from w. 
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Logical Relationships Among 36 Different Interpretations 
of the Statement: NoW Shall Y, Unless b. 
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But do statements of the form of (4) occur in statutes or regu-
lations? They do in American legal text. See, for example, Sec-
tion SOS(a) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
Sec. 355: 
(a) No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction 
into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an ap-
proval of an application filed pursuant to subsection 
(b) of the section is in effect with respect to such 
.drug. 
When ~ of (1) is in the form of a negation of a permission-type 
statement, the b and d interpretations of the first IF-THEN part of 
(4), along with the full interpretations that they are part of, are 
no longer reasonable interpretations. The number of different 
interpretations is reduced to 18. The omitted 18 are not strong 
enough to be reasonable interpretations. They can be logically 
inferred from the included 18, but not vice versa. The excluded 
ones merely permit where the included ones obligate, but the first 
IF-THEN parts of (5) definitely must be interpreted as imposing 
obligations. 
No W may Y, Unless b. (~=NoW may Y.) 
Interpretations: al a2 a3 a4 aS a6 a7 aS a9 
cl c2 c3 c4 cS c6 c7 c8 c9 
(S) 
The logical relationships among these are as shown in Figure 3 
above. 
Along with the within-sentence ambiguity illustrated in (1) 
through (5), there may also be between-sentence ambiguity when 
the 'a' of 'a unless~· is either 'al and a2' or 'al or a2'. 
al and a2, unless ~· (~ = al and a2. ) 
Interpretations: f/S f/W f/---
f/S IF NOT b, THEN al AND a2, AND 
IF b, THEN NOT al and NOT a2. 
(NOT ~ = NOT al AND NOT a2 ~ 
f/W IF NOT b, THEN al AND a2, AND 
IF b, THEN NOT al OR NOT a2. 
(NOT a = NOT al-oR NOT a2~ 
f/--- IF NOT~. THENral AND a2: 
(6) 
If the al and a2 of (6) are each of the form of the a in (4) 
i.e., in the for;-'No V shall W' and 'No X shall Y' ---then 
there will be the following 68 interpretations of the 'unless' of 
(6): 
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fa/Sl fb/Sl fc/Sl fd/Sl 4 
24 
fa/S8 fb/S8 fc/S8 fd/S8 4 
fa/Wl fb/Wl fc/Wl fd/Wl 4 
24 
fa/W8 fb/W8 fc/W8 fd/W8 4 
fa/--- fb/--- fc/--- fd/--- 4 
68 Total 
This narrow view of the possible interpretations of the 'unless 
of (6), of course, assumes that al and a2 have the same sub-inter-
pretations from among the 36 possibilities of (4). But, is this 
assumption realistic? Is it beyond the pale of reason that a court 
might decide to interpret 'unless' with differing al and a2 sub-
interpretations? If the courts are free to so behave, it enriches 
the interpretative possibilities immensely -- more than 30-fold. 
The number of possible interpretations of 'unless' zooms from 68 to 
2064. Summarized briefly: 
al 
( (fa)(Sl) ) 
( ( :)/( :) ) X 
( (fd) (S8) ) 
a2 
( (fa)-(Sl) ) 
( ( :)/( :) ) 
( (fd) (S8) ) 
( (fa) (Wl) ) ( (fa) (Wl) ) 
( ( :)/( :) ) X ( ( :)/( :) ) 
( (fd) (W8) ) ( (fd) (W8) ) 
(fa/---) (fa/---) 
(: )x(: ) 
(fd/---) (fd/---) 
al or a2, unless E_. (a = al or a2.) 






The 'unless' of (7) adds another 68 possible interpretations 
of this monstrously ambiguous little word -- or another 2064 --
depending upon whether the courts are found to be narrow or ven-
turesome in their interpretation. A near gross of 'unless's is 
entirely troublesome enough, but more than 28 gross is just utterly 
gross. 
If the plain language movement for the improvement of legal 
drafting is to realize its full potential, it must deal with such 
structural problems. To achieve clarity, awesomely multi-faceted 
structural terms like 'unless' -- and there may be a hundred or 
more of them -- must give way to the lowest common denominators of 
structure in legal discourse: the defined AND, OR, NOT, IF ••• 
THEN---, and IF AND ONLY IF •.• THEN--- of normalized drafting. 
Getting these little-in-size but big-in-significance words under 
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control will permit a giant stride forward in improving the clarity 
of between-sentence structure. The stage will then be set for the 
more formidable task of upgrading the within-sentence structure. 
5 NORMALIZED STATEMENTS AND DIAGRAMS 
If, to qualify as plain, a language must have clear structure, 
then the achievement of plain language will be benefited by having 
available some clear language to discuss structure. In particular, 
to discuss the structure of legal norms it will be helpful to have 
some clear terms with which to discuss normative language. Speci-
fying a series of definitions in this section is directed toward 
that end, as well as toward defining what is meant by legal draft-







CONDITIONAL NORMAL FORM 
NORMALIZED 
LEGAL NORM 
SIMPLE LEGAL NORM 









SINGLE-RESULT COMPLEX LEGAL NORM 
MULTIPLE-RESULT COMPLEX LEGAL NORM 
statement is SINGULAR IF AND ONLY IF 
it consists of just one constituent sentence. 
statement is a CONJUNCTION IF AND ONLY IF 
it consists of two constituent sentences joined by 'AND'. 
statement is a DISJUNCTION IF AND ONLY IF 
it consists of two constituent sentences joined by 'OR'. 
statement is a CONDITIONAL IF AND ONLY IF 
it consists of two constituent sentences joined by 'IF ••• THEN 
The ANTECEDENT of a CONDITIONAL is the set of sentences between the 
'IF' and the 'THEN'. 
The CONSEQUENT of a CONDITIONAL is the set of sentences after the 
'THEN'. 
A statement is NORMATIVE IF AND ONLY IF it includes some DEONTIC 
terminology. 
A statement includes some DEONTIC terminology IF AND ONLY IF it 
includes some form of the term 'obligated', some form of the 
term 'permitted', or some form of the term 'forbidden'. 
(Note that a statement may be NORMATIVE0 (that is, 'normative' in 
the ordinary language sense) without being NORMATIVE, and it is 
possible that the NORMATIVE0 version of a statement will express 
a proposition that is semantically equivalent to its NORMATIVE 
counter-part. For example, the NORMATIVE0 statement, 'Twenty-one-
year-old males shall register for the draft' is semantically equiv-
alent to its NORMATIVE counter-parts, 'Twenty-one-year-old males 
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are obligated to register for the draft' and 'It is obligatory 
that twenty-one-year-old males register for the draft'.) 
A statement is a RESULT IF AND ONLY IF it is a NORMATIVE statement 
in the CONSEQUENT. 
A statement is in CONDITIONAL NORMAL FORM IF AND ONLY IF 
1. it is an IF ••• THEN--- statement, AND 
2. its ANTECEDENT is either SINGULAR or a CONJUNCTION or a 
DISJUNCTION, AND 
3. its CONSEQUENT is either SINGULAR or a CONJUNCTION or in 
CONDITIONAL NORMAL FORM. 
A statement is NORMALIZED IF AND ONLY IF 
1) A. it is in CONDITIONAL NORMAL FORM, AND 
B. its CONSEQUENT is NORMATIVE {that is, it is a RESULT), OR 
2) it is a CONJUNCTION OF NORMALIZED statements (or logically 
equivalent to such a CONJUNCTION). 
Thus, a statement is NORMALIZED IF AND ONLY IF 
1) A. it is an IF ••• THEN--- statement, AND 
B. the set of sentences between the 'IF' and the 'THEN' is 
either SINGULAR or a CONJUNCTION or a DISJUNCTION, AND 
C. the set of sentences after the 'THEN' is a RESULT that 
is either SINGULAR or a CONJUNCTION or in CONDITIONAL 
NORMAL FORM, OR 
2) it is a CONJUNCTION of NORMALIZED statements (or logically 
equivalent to such a CONJUNCTION). 
A statement is a LEGAL NORM IF AND ONLY IF it is a SIMPLE LEGAL NORM 
or a COMPLEX LEGAL NORM. 
A statement is a SIMPLE LEGAL NORM IF AND ONLY IF 
1. it is in NORMALIZED form, AND 
2. its ANTECEDENT is either SINGULAR or a CONJUNCTION, AND 
3. its RESULT is SINGULAR. 
A statement is a COMPLEX LEGAL NORM IF AND ONLY IF it is a SINGLE-
RESULT COMPLEX LEGAL NORM or a MULTIPLE-RESULT COMPLEX LEGAL 
NORM 
A statement is a SINGLE-RESULT COMPLEX LEGAL NORM IF AND ONLY IF 
it is a CONJUNCTION (or its logical equivalent) of SIMPLE 
LEGAL NORMS each of which has the same RESULT. 
A statement is a MULTIPLE-RESULT COMPLEX LEGAL NORM IF AND ONLY IF 
it is a CONJUNCTION (or its logical equivalent) of SIMPLE LEGAL 
NORMS such that at least two of them have different RESULTS. 
In these definitions, use has been made of the defined term 
'IF AND ONLY IF'. It is handy for use with SINGLE-RESULT COMPLEX 
LEGAL NORMS as well as with definitions. It is defined as follows: 
a IF AND ONLY IF b =df IF AND ONLY IF ~. THEN ~· 
It is also handy to have for use with SINGLE-RESULT COMPLEX LEGAL 
NORMS the following definition of 'IF': 
~IF b =df IF ~. THEN a. 
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To represent NORMALIZED statements in a form that makes the 
logical relationships between the parts of such statements stand 
out, it is also handy to have diagrams of such statements that 
emphasize the logical relationships. One such set of diagrams, 
here called 'arrow diagrams', is the following: 











Text of Statement 
a AND b. 
a AND b. 
a OR b. 
IF i!_, THEN E_. 
NOT a. 




IF AND ONLY IF ~, THEN b. >--< i!. --~ b 
i!_ IF b. i!_<-- E.-• 
i!_ IF AND ONLY IF b. a -<----~ b-• 
With these definitions and arrow diagrams, one NORMALIZED ver-
sion of the excerpt from the American patent statute in section 2 
can be constructed and represented diagrammatically as follows: 
IF 
1. all other relevant conditions are fulfilled, Co 
THEN 
2. IF 
A. the invention was NOT known or used by others in this Na 
country, or patented or described in a printed publi-
cation in this or a foreign country, before the inven-
tion thereof by the applicant for patent, AND 
B. the invention was NOT patented or described in a Nb 
printed publication in this or a foreign country or 
in public use or on sale in this country, more than 




H. it is obligatory that the applicant is granted a patent, h 
AND 
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3. IF 
A. otherwise N* 
THEN 
B. it is forbidden that the applicant is granted a patent. h* 
The arrow diagram: >-Co -+ [>-Na-Nb-. • ·-~ h 
>-N* -+h* 
In this arrow diagram 'Co' represents all other relevant conditions 
in other sections of the patent statute and elsewhere, and 'Na', 
'Nb', and 'h' represent the sentences in the NORMALIZED statement 
to their left above. The 'N*' represents 'otherwise', which in 
this case is the negation of 'Na AND Nb AND ••• Ng', which is logi-
cally equivalent to 'a ORb OR ••• g'. The 'h*' represents a state-
ment that is DEONTICALLY related to 'h'. Examination of the with-
in-sentence and DEONTIC structure of 'h' and 'h*' is necessary to 
show what this relationship is. Assume that 'h' is an abbrevia-
tion for 'OD4gx' and 'h*' is an abbreviation for 'FD4gx', which 
is logically equivalent to 'OND4gx'. These, in turn, represent 
the following statements: 
0D4gx: It is obligatory that the granting of a patent is 
done for the applicant x. 
FD4gx: 
OND4gx: 
It is forbidden that the granting of a patent is 
done for the applicant x. 
It is obligatory that IT IS NOT SO THAT the grant-
ing of a patent i~ done for applicant x. 
Note that the last two statements are subtly different from: 
OD4Ngx: It is obligatory that the NOT granting of a patent 
is done for the applicant x. 
The text that follows 'OD4gx' (and the others, too) is a some-
what more formal way of stating what might more informally be ex-
pressed, 'The applicant shall be granted a patent.' But the more 
formal statement itself should be understood to be a short ver-
sion of the more complete statement, 'It is obligatory that some 
unnamed legal person see to it that (that is, that person is the 
one legally responsible, if it is not so) the state of affairs 
described by the statement 'The applicant is granted a patent' 
is so for the benefit of the applicant. 
With such arrow diagrams it is possible to clearly represent 
the logical relations between RESULTS and ANTECEDENT conditions. 
In this diagram: 
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there are two "pathways" to RESULT d (ab and ac) and four "path-
ways" to RESULT g (abe, ace, abd, and acf). Each "pathway" repre-
sents a sufficient set of conditions for reaching that RESULT. A 
"pathway" is the set of conditions expressed by the sentence abbre-
viations between the tail (~) and the head (--~) of an arrow. No 
matter how complex the NORMALIZED statements become, their arrow 
diagrams show clearly the "pathways" (sufficient sets of condi-
tions) for each RESULT. 
Another distinguishing feature of the arrow diagrams is that 
they are a parenthesis-free notation for representing logical re-
lationships, similar to the so-called "Polish" notation of Jan 
Lukasiewicz (Copi, 1973) in some respects, but different in others. 
The arrow diagrams also provide a brief way to summarize some 
important logical relationships. In what follows, each of the 
statements represented by the diagrams on either side of the 
'*-----*' is logically inferrable from the one represented on the 
other side; so, they are logically equivalent. 
>{!]~£ [ >-_!! ~.£ N [!J C:! *-----* *-----* >-b~c 
)-.~~[~ *-----* [ >-~~~ N [! *-----* [~] 
c >-_!!~£ 
>-a ~b *-----* ).... Nb ~Na [! *-----* r~ -a 
[>-a ~b r!J >-<_!!~E. *-----* [!J *-----* >-Na~Nb 
~-[!J [~-E.] [! *-----* *-----* ~ a-c 
-a:-j 
L~-cj *-----* [.!!a] *-----* 
Also logically equivalent in classical two-valued proposi-
tional logic, but questionable in other systems of propositional 
logic, are: 
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>-a-b-~ *-----* >-a+>-b+c NNa *-----* a 
>-a-+b *-----* N[! *-----* >-a+Nb 
N>-a-+b *-----* 
The definition of NORMALIZED statements in this paper (as it 
has been developed to date) deals with sentential and DEONTIC op-
erators. To be more adequate in attaining its intended goal, this 
definition will need to be extended to include consideration of 
the relations between the ideas expressed by parts of sentences 
and consideration of Hohfeldian ideas (Allen, 1974). The concept 
of NORMALIZED legal drafting has evolved recently and is still in 
process of change (Allen, 1957, 1968, 1974). 
6 CRITERIA FOR CLARITY OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS AND ADEQUACY OF DRAFTING 
To more rigorously assess the clarity of expression in legal 
documents at present and the adequacy of their drafting, it will 
be helpful to have available more precisely defined criteria for 
characterising the clarity of. expression and the intent of the 
drafter. Given such criteria, it will be possible to test with a 
sample of legal documents, impressions like those of the author 
that, for example, semantic uncertainties in legal documents .tend 
to be deliberately included by drafters, while structural uncert-
ainties tend to be inadvertently included. The discussion in 
this section is meant to be a start toward the development of such 
criteria; it is a set of tentative suggestions about which con-
structive supplementation is most welcome. 
Whether a legal document is well-drafted or ill-drafted is not 
a simple matter of whether or not its ideas are expressed clearly. 
A reader might be uncertain about what the drafter intended to as-
sert, because the drafter intended just that. There are a variety 
of legitimate reasons why a drafter might deliberately write un-
clearly (to achieve political compromise, to provide flexibility 
in the legal decision-making process, to delegate decision-making 
power to another decision-maker, or to postpone a decision, for 
example), and if an unclear document precisely achieves its in-
tended purposes, would it be appropriate to characterise that 
document as ill-drafted? Here, it is proposed that the adequacy 
of the drafting should be regarded as a function of both the 
clarity of the document and the intent of the drafter. But even 
the matter of clear expression has its complexities; it has two 
aspects -- the semantic and the structural. If a statement is 
uncertain in either respect, the expression of the writer's ideas 
is uncertain. 
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Answering the following four questions and proceeding through 
a document on a sentence-by-sentence basis, it is possible to 
characterise both the clarity of expression of the document (part-
by-part and as a whole) and the adequacy of its drafting: 
Does this statement in its structure contain uncertainty to the 
intended audience that could have been avoided? 
Does this statement in its semantics contain uncertainty to the 
intended audience that could have been avoided? 
Is it more pro~able than not that the uncertainty in the structure 
of this statement was deliberately included by the drafter? 
Is it more probable than not that the uncertainty in the semantics 
of this statement was deliberately included by the drafter? 
Given an analyst's best judgment on whether a document con-
tains structural or semantic uncertainties and whether the draft-
er deliberately included them, it is possible to use the follow-
ing contextual definitions to characterise the document in terms 
of whether it is CLEARLY STATED or UNCLEARLY STATED, whether it 
is CLEARLY WORDED or UNCLEARLY WORDED, whether it is CLEARLY EX-
PRESSED or UNCLEARLY EXPRESSED, and whether it is WELL-DRAFTED 
or ILL-DRAFTED, and if ILL-DRAFTED, whether ILL-DRAFTED semanti-
cally, ILL-DRAFTED structurally, or ILL-DRAFTED both semantically 
and structurally. 
IF a statement contains uncertainty in its structure that could 
have been avoided, THEN it is UNCLEARLY STATED: otherwise, it is 
CLEARLY STATED. 
IF a statement contains uncertainty in its semantics that could 
have been avoided, THEN it is UNCLEARLY WORDED; otherwise, it is 
CLEARLY WORDED. 
IF a statement is both CLEARLY STATED and CLEARLY WORDED, THEN 
it is CLEARLY EXPRESSED; otherwise, it is UNCLEARLY EXPRESSED. 
IF a statement is CLEARLY EXPRESSED or the uncertainty was deliber-
ately included, THEN the statement is WELL-DRAFTED; otherwise, it 
is ILL-DRAFTED. 
With these definitions, legal documents are categorised into nine 
cases and into four types with respect to their clarity of expres-
sion and four types with respect to their drafting adequacy. 
There are four cases that are WELL-DRAFTED: 
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(1) those that are CLEARLY EXPRESSED, 
(2) those that are CLEARLY STATED and deliberately UNCLEARLY 
WORDED, 
(3) those that are CLEARLY WORDED and deliberately UNCLEARLY 
STATED, and 
(4) those that are deliberately UNCLEARLY STATED and deliber-
ately UNCLEARLY WORDED. 
There are two cases that are ILL-DRAFTED structurally: 
(1) those that are CLEARLY WORDED and inadvertently UNCLEARLY 
STATED and 
(2) those that are deliberately UNCLEARLY WORDED and inadver~ 
tently UNCLEARLY STATED. 
There are also two cases that are ILL-DRAFTED semantically: 
(1) those that are CLEARLY STATED and inadvertently UNCLEARLY 
WORDED and 
(2) those that are deliberately UNCLEARLY STATED and inadver-
tently UNCLEARLY WORDED. 
Finally, there is just one case that is ILL-DRAFTED both structur-
ally and semantically: the one that is inadvertently UNCLEARLY 
STATED and inadvertently UNCLEARLY WORDED. 
If 90 percent of the sentences of a legal document are ILL-
DRAFTED by these criteria, it says rather strongly something 
about the adequacy of the drafting of that document. On the other 
hand, if 90 percent of the sentences of a document are WELL-DRAFTED, 
it says something else rather strongly. Most documents will prob-
ably fall between these extremes. The significant point is that 
such criteria permit the construction of a scale for measuring the 
adequacy of a document's drafting -- a much-needed scale that 
takes into account aspects of a statement that are more significant 
than mere sentence-length or word-length. 
7 CONCLUSION 
The theme of this paper is simple. It is: to be plain, lan-
guage must have clear structure. Having clear structure is also 
a simple matter. But recognizing that structure is complex is a 
different thing entirely. Many readers and writers are unaware of 
the awesome ambiguity that is embodied in seemingly clear little 
connecting words such as 'unless'. And unawareness breeds content-
ment. Reformers bent on achieving plain language that can be un-
derstood by intended audiences tend to ignore structure and focus 
their efforts virtually entirely upon getting short sentences and 
short words. There is peril in ignoring structure, and not merely 
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professional reputations are at stake. Brethren of the bar may 
soon be exposed to the transforming thrusts of malpractice suits 
for imprecision where precision is demanded in legal language. 
But to a profession that holds itself out to the public as expert 
in the art of communication, surely the inspiration for change 
should arise from a more noble source. How long can the reformers 
themselves continue to ignore that language has a structural di-
mension that affects meaning, as well as a semantic dimension? 
Lawyers do at least as well as any professional group around in 
skillfully handling the semantic dimension of written communi-
cation, but in handling structure, we are no better than rank 
amateurs -- and sometimes worse! Should the "plain language" to 
be achieved by current reform efforts leave us no better off? 
Short sentences will help, but they are no panacea. Imposed in a 
muddleheaded fashion, they could strangle more sophisticated re-
form efforts. As utilized by untutored heads, they frequently 
result in merely structural trade-off, rather than the definite 
improvement that is possible: inadvertent within-sentence ambi-
guity being traded for inadvertent between-sentence ambiguity. 
The enlightened way is to profit from the experience of others. 
It is still no less a measure of wisdom today to be aware that a 
dwarf on the shoulders of a giant can see further than the giant. 
Modern logicians have devised tools of exquisite deftness for the 
very problem that legal drafters confront. We should be aware of 
them and use them. We do use definitions -- but clumsily. We do 
use normative language -- but clumsily. It is NORMATIVE0 where it 
should be NORMATIVE. We continue to construct sentences that are 
cluttered with astonishingly ambiguous terms like 'unless'. When 
drafters mean to be clear, all such maskers of meaning should be 
replaced by the lowest common denominators of structural discourse: 
AND, OR, NOT, IF ••• THEN---, and IF AND ONLY IF ••• THEN 
Only then will the between-sentence structure of the legal draft-
er's house begin to take on the semblance of order that is demanded 
by computer-servants if they are to do fully their work in such 
establishments. The NOR!1ALIZED "plain language" of the 1980's can 
succeed where the "ruly" English of the 1950's did not. Getting 
clear between-sentence structure can set the stage for the more 
formidable task of getting a process started for learning to deftly 
manage the within-sentence structure. 
But how shall all of this wonderful structural clarity in legal 
drafting through NORMALIZATION come into being? Perhaps there 
would be no more effective way than for it to become a presumption 
of drafter negligence for terms like 'unless' to appear in a will 
or a contract or a statute unaccompanied by a subscript to indicate 
in what logical sense it is intended: UNLESS1 , UNLESS2, 
UNLESS4128• etc. That just might get the job done! 
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